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Adverse Inferences Based on Non-Party Invocations:
The Real Magic Trick in Fifth Amendment
Civil Cases
Consider the following scenario: Plaintiff brings a civil suit
against a corporate defendant based upon alleged acts of the corpo-
ration's former employee, Jones. The departure of Jones from the
defendant's organization occurred before trial and was not on
friendly terms. At trial, the plaintiffs attorney calls Jones to the
stand knowing that Jones will invoke his fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination. Plaintiffs counsel elicits Jones' invoca-
tion on the stand and argues in closing argument to the jury that
inferences should be drawn against the defendant corporation
based upon Jones' invocation. The trial judge instructs the jury
that it is permitted to draw the inference that ifJones had answered,
his response would have been unfavorable to the corporation.'
This note explores a recent trend in which courts are allowing
the fact-finder to draw adverse inferences from a witness's invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege in a civil proceeding. 2 Courts
allow the inference regardless of whether a relationship exists be-
tween the party to the suit and the witness who invokes the fifth
amendment at the time of trial.
Part I of this note examines the history of the self-incrimination
privilege in civil cases, the policies behind the privilege, and the
circumstances in which the privilege may be invoked. Part II ex-
plores the abuses of the privilege in the civil context and the meth-
ods courts have used to prevent these abuses. Part III discusses the
recent use of adverse inferences as a device to control the privilege,
particularly when invoked by a non-party witness. Part IV argues
that allowing adverse inferences, based upon a non-party witness's
invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination, is unjustified.
The prejudicial impact of the invocation simply outweighs the pro-
bative value of the invocation. Accordingly, the invocation of the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination by a non-party
1 Professor Heidt supports this approach. See Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle-The Fifth
Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 YALE L.J. 1062 (1982). Professor Heidt begins his work
with two quotations: "By incantations a conjurer draws a circle around a person concealing
all within from demons;" and "He could not draw a conjurer's circle around the whole
matter [by relying on the privilege];" Id. at 1064.
2 This note analyzes whether such inferences are proper by focusing on two recent
court of appeals cases: Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3417 (1984) (No. 84-338); Brink's Inc. v. City of New York,
717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983).
witness, in no special relation with a party, should be kept from the
finder of fact.
I. Background on the Privilege in Civil Cases
The privilege against self-incrimination has long existed in
criminal cases.3 The Supreme Court extended the privilege to civil
cases in McCarthy v. Arndstein,4 holding: "The privilege [against
self-incrimination] is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of
the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It
applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer
might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it." 5
The scope of the privilege is broad. Hoffman v. United States,6
indicates the fifth amendment privilege may be invoked if the an-
swer would be incriminating. Under the Hoffman standard, the in-
vocation of the privilege against self-incrimination is not a
confession of crime, and is permitted even though the invoking
party has committed no crime.7 Courts generally must review these
invocations to determine if they are proper under the circum-
stances. Nevertheless, given the wide latitude for invoking the priv-
ilege, some contend that, in effect, the decision to invoke is
unreviewable.8
3 A full discussion of the history of the privilege against self-incrimination is beyond
the scope of this note. For an excellent discussion of its history, see 8 J. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2250 (McNaugton rev. 1961); E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE §§ 114-117 (3d ed. 1984).
4 266 U.S. 34 (1924) (habeas corpus action to determine whether Arndstein could be
held in custody for contempt because of his refusal to answer questions in a bankruptcy
proceeding). The fifth amendment was first made applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
5 266 U.S. at 40.
6 341 U.S. 479 (1951). The Court in Hoffman provided the formulation for a test of
when the privilege against self-incrimination may be invoked, stating:
The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that would in themselves sup-
port a conviction under a federal criminal statute but likewise embraces those
which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claim-
ant for a federal crime. But this protection must be confined to instances where
the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct answer ...
It is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, . . . and to require him to
answer if "it clearly appears to the court he is mistaken."
Id. at 486 (citations omitted). For a discussion of how difficult it is for the court to make this
determination, see note 8 infra and accompanying text.
7 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957) (no inconsistency between invo-
cation of the fifth amendment and later protestations of innocence).
8 The Hoffman Court recognized the difficulty of policing invocations of the fifth
amendment, noting: "The immediate and potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure
transcend any difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on society in the
detection and prosecution of crime." 341 U.S. at 440 (quoting United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 698 (1944)). Professor Heidt argues that the wide instances of when the privilege
may be invoked and its resistance to attack when invoked make it a self-policing system.
Heidt, supra note 1, at 1065-71. Judge Stern, dissenting in Lionti v. Lloyd's Ins. Co., 709 F.2d
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To properly analyze the fifth amendment privilege in civil
cases, courts must examine the policies underlying the privilege. 9
In M1lurphy v. Waterfront Commission, '0 the Supreme Court addressed
the policies underlying the privilege:
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important
advance in the development of our liberty-'one of the great
landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.'" It re-
flects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspira-
tions: our unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our
preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial sys-
tem of criminal justice; our fear that the self-incriminating state-
ments will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our
sense of fair play which dictates "a fair state-individual balance
by requiring the government to leave the individual alone until
good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the en-
tire load," our respect for the inviolability of the human person-
ality and of the right of each individual "to a private enclave
where he may lead a private life," our own distrust of self-depre-
catory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while
sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the
innocent." 1 1
Professor Wigmore, no advocate of the privilege against self-
incrimination, has identified four policy concerns underlying the
privilege. 12 First, the privilege is supposed to frustrate bad laws
237, 245 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 490 (1983), stated: "Under the fifth amend-
ment test, [of when a party may invoke] once a witness invokes the privilege it is nigh to
impossible to determine why he has done so, or to overrule his refusal [to testify]."
9 McCormick states:
The continued vitality and general acceptance of the privilege depends upon the
maintenance of sufficient flexibility to adjust the privilege to the different times
and different contexts. . . . If the privilege is to remain viable it must retain such
flexibility, and it must reflect an appropriate balance among the wide variety of
policy factors as they are affected by the specific context in which it is invoked.
E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 118, at 288 (3d ed. 1984).
10 378 U.S. 52 (1964). In Murphy, petitioners were granted immunity from prosecution
under state law but not under federal law and were held in contempt when they refused to
answer grand jury questions. The Supreme Court held that one jurisdiction may not com-
pel a witness to give answers which might incriminate him under the laws of another juris-
diction absent an effective immunity provision. Id. at 79.
11 Id. at 55 (citations omitted).
12 See generallyJ. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 310-17. Twelve policy justifications
are identified, but Wigmore attributes real weight only to the last four. The twelve identi-
fied policies are:
(I) It protects the innocent defendant from convicting himself by a bad perform-
ance on the witness stand; (2) It avoids burdening the court with false testimony;
(3) It encourages third-party witnesses to appear and testify by removing the fear
that they might be compelled to incriminate themselves;. . . (4) The privilege is a
recognition of the practical limits of governmental power; truthful self-incriminat-
ing answers cannot be compelled, so why try; . . . (5) The privilege prevents pro-
cedures of the kind used by the infamous courts of Star Chamber, High
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and bad procedures.' 3 As Wigmore notes, this argument proves
too much, because the privilege will frustrate good laws and good
procedures. 14
A second policy argument suggests that the privilege prevents
the government from using its substantial powers to ferret out
wrongs.' 5 This policy argument applies in the civil context as well
as the criminal context because while the government's ability to
use discovery is not directly implicated in suits between private par-
ties, nothing but the privilege prevents the government from sitting
back and enjoying the fruits of incriminating statements made in
civil cases.
A third argument asserts that "the privilege prevents torture
and other inhumane treatment of a human being."' 6 McCormick
describes this policy as follows: "To place an individual in a posi-
tion in which his natural instincts and personal interests dictate that
he should lie and then to punish him for lying, or for refusing to lie
or violate his natural instincts, is an intolerable invasion of his per-
sonal dignity."' 7 Not all writers on the subject find this choice bur-
densome,' 8 but whatever merit this argument has in the criminal
context, it should apply equally to the civil context.
Finally, Wigmore notes that "[t]he Privilege contributes to-
ward a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to
leave the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing
him and by requiring the government in its contest with the individ-
Commission and Inquisition; (6) It is justified by history, whose tests it has stood;
the tradition which it has created is a satisfactory one; ...(7) The privilege pre-
serves respect for the legal process by avoiding situations which are likely to de-
generate into undignified, uncivilized and regrettable scenes; (8) It spurs the
prosecutor to do a complete and competent independent investigation; ...(9)
The privilege aids in the frustration of "bad laws" and "bad procedures," espe-
cially in the area of political and religious belief; [10] The privilege, together with
the requirement of probable cause prior to prosecution, protects the individual
from being prosecuted for crimes of insufficient notoriety or seriousness to be of
real concern to society; ...(11) The privilege prevents torture and other inhu-
mane treatment of a human being; ...[and] (12) The privilege contributes to-
ward a fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave the
individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him and by requiring the
government in its contest with the individual to shoulder the entire load.
Id. (citations omitted).
13 Id. at 313.
14 Id.
15 Wigmore calls this "the fishing expedition" reason which could put us all in jail if
carried to the extreme. Id. at 314-15.
16 Id. at 315-16.
17 E. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 118, at 287.
18 Bentham referred to this cruel trilemma as the "old woman's reason" because only
an old woman would find this choice burdensome. J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 297
n.2. See also O'Brien, The Fifth Amendment: Fox Hunters, Old Women, Hermits, and the Burger
Court, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 26 (1978).
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ual to shoulder the entire load."' 19 Because the government is not
normally a party in a civil suit, this policy would seem inapplicable.
This policy concern, however, also contemplates that the adver-
sarial process should be fair. 20 Thus, the notion that the privilege
against self-incrimination preserves the fairness and integrity of the
judicial system applies both to civil and criminal proceedings.
Arguably, the policy reasons for the use of the privilege in civil
cases are not as strong as those in the criminal area, but valuable
goals are served by extending the protections of the fifth amend-
ment to civil cases. These protections should not be abrogated.
Applying the privilege in civil cases is more difficult, however. De-
termining what evidentiary value to accord the assertion of the priv-
ilege in the civil context is problematic.
Two proposed rules highlight the different values assigned to
the privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court's pro-
posed standard strongly protects the privilege and makes no dis-
tinction between civil and criminal cases, 2' whereas the proposed
Model Code of Evidence Rule allows comment upon the exercise of
the privilege against self-incrimination and allows all reasonable in-
ferences to be drawn by the fact-finder. 22 Neither of these all-or-
nothing views prevails. 23
The fundamental difference between the two approaches is the
evidentiary value given the invocations. Those supporting the
Supreme Court's approach argue that any evidentiary value in the
19 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2251, at 317.
20 McCormick states: "Apart from its value to individuals, whether innocent or guilty,
the privilege also serves broader functions. It encourages respect for and protects the dig-
nity of the judicial system." E. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 118, at 287.
21 The Supreme Court's proposed rule is:
SUPREME COURT STANDARD 513: COMMENT UPON OR INFERENCE
FROM CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE; INSTRUCTION;
(a) Comment or inference not permitted.- The claim of a privilege, whether in the
present proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment
by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(b) Claiming privilege without knowledge ofjury.- In jury cases, proceedings shall
be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of
privilege without the knowledge of the jury.
(c)Jury instruction.- Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw
an adverse inference from a claim of privilege is entitled to an instruction that no
inference may be drawn therefrom.
20 U.S. DiG. FED. RULES OF EvID. 493 (Lawyers' ed. 1975).
22 The Model Code's proposed Rule 233 is:
If a privilege to refuse to disclose, or a privilege to prevent another from disclos-
ing, a matter is claimed and allowed, the judge and counsel may comment thereon,
and the trier of fact may draw all reasonable inferences therefrom.
2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 513, at 513-3 (1982).
23 State adoption of these proposed rules of evidence has run the gamut from accepting
the Supreme Court Standard, accepting the Model Code approach, or accepting some hy-
brid of the two approaches. SeeJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 22, § 513[03], at
513-7 to 513-10.
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invocation is outweighed by the invocation's prejudicial impact;
while those favoring the Model Code approach suggest there is evi-
dentiary value to the invocation and that this value outweighs any
prejudicial impact. 24
The policy background, while limited, permits the examination
of the problems that may be caused by extending the privilege
against self-incrimination into the civil context. It also permits an
analysis of the courts' attempts to deal with these problems.
II. Abuses of the Privilege in the Civil Context and Judicial
Responses
The use of the privilege in civil cases has been criticized on a
number of grounds. McCormick identifies three: (1) We do not
need it anymore because its basic premise, the threat of torture, is
no longer realistically present; (2) the privilege is enacted at too
great a cost to the truth; and (3) the privilege may be impossible to
implement effectively, i.e., inferences are inevitable. 25
Professor Heidt explains the problems a plaintiff may face in
proving his case because of invocations of the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination: "Current Fifth Amendment ju-
risprudence sacrifices the determination of truth, the policies un-
derlying liberal discovery, and the vindication of public and private
rights to an extent rarely appreciated." 26 According to Heidt, the
privilege enables defense counsel to resist discovery and slow the
suit down because of the wide instances when it may be invoked
and its resistance to attack when invoked. 27 These problems stem
24 The conflict between the Model Code and the Federal Rules has been described as:
If the view is taken that privileges are an impediment to the fact finding process
but that experience has proven that they cannot be completely eliminated, then
additionally fostering them through prohibiting comment is deemed undesirable.
This seems to have been the rationale of the Model Code . . . .However, ...
[there is] the view that if the privileges are considered valuable enough to adopt,
then they are also worth effectuating. The proposed [Federal] Rules also entertain
this viewpoint.
Comment, Federal Rules of Evidence and the Law of Privilege, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1286, 1370
(1969).
25 E. CLEARY, supra note 9, § 118, at 286.
26 Heidt, supra note 1, at 1064. While Professor.Heidt notes that organizational entities
have no fifth amendment privilege, the corporation can use the privilege of its employees.
Id. at 1067. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) provides that privileged information is not discovera-
ble, so no sanctions may be imposed for resisting discovery by claiming the privilege. Heidt
also notes the four ways in which invocations of the privilege are traditionally attacked: (1)
on the ground that prosecution is barred by double jeopardy; (2) on the ground that the
response will not incriminate; (3) on the ground that prosecution is barred by a statute of
limitations; and (4) on the ground that prosecution is barred by past grants of use immu-
nity. While all of these provide at least some control over the invocations of the privilege,
Heidt finds them ineffective. Heidt, supra note 1, at 1071-82.
27 See notes 6, 8 supra and accompanying text.
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from the Hoffman standard of when the privilege can be invoked.28
Permissible instances are broad and the judge has little information
on which to base a determination of the propriety of the invoca-
tion.29 Arguably, the system is essentially self-policing and open to
abuse by the unscrupulous.
Courts have employed different methods to control the per-
ceived inequities of allowing a fifth amendment invocation in civil
cases. In addition to allowing adverse inferences, courts have also
used immunity and procedural controls.
Professor Heidt suggests that use immunity cannot adequately
control fifth amendment invocations in civil cases. 30 Heidt indi-
cates that use immunity "opens up plaintiff's discovery . . . at the
cost of foreclosing the government's opportunity for later prosecu-
tion. Assuming trial courts may grant use immunity in private civil
cases, they should not so encroach on a domain traditionally re-
served for prosecutions without legislative direction to do so."31
Heidt's point is perhaps debatable because the statute of limita-
tions on the criminal offense could expire before the civil suit is
tried. But because the privilege also applies at the discovery
stage,3 2 Heidt's argument is not without merit.
Courts also resort to other methods of controlling invocations
in civil proceedings. In some cases, the court found it appropriate
to stay the civil proceeding until the threat of criminal prosecution
ended. 33 Not all courts are willing to do this, however. In Arthurs v.
Stern,34 for example, a physician indicted by a grand jury for dis-
pensing illegal prescriptions sought a stay of the disciplinary hear-
ing until the criminal charges had been cleared up. The court
28 If a witness's invocation of the fifth amendment is challenged, it would seem quite
easy to construct a hypothetical in which the answer to a question could furnish a "link in a
chain of circumstantial evidence."
29 See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
30 Heidt, supra note 1, at 1100. Use immunity compels a witness to give self-incriminat-
ing testimony, but provides that such testimony and the fruits of it may not be used in
subsequent prosecutions of the witness. Transactional immunity gives the witness com-
plete protection against prosecution for any offense about which the witness testifies. 81
AM. JUR. 2D IWitnesses § 59 (1976). As a practical matter, it is difficult to prove evidence is
not a fruit of the testimony given under a use immunity grant. So, while the use of immu-
nity is an effective weapon against the failure of proof the privilege can cause, the cost to
society is great, unless it can be established that the interest of society in prosecuting for
this offense is minimal. Heidt notes that granting immunity is traditionally a function of the
executive branch, not the judicial branch. Heidt, supra note 1, at 1100-02.
31 Heidt, supra note 1, at 1102.
32 See note 33 infra.
33 See, e.g., Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979)
(proper response to plaintiffs invocation of the fifth amendment privilege in discovery was
a stay and not an automatic dismissal); Dienstag v. Bronsen, 49 F.R.D. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)
(proper response to defendant's invocation of the fifth amendment privilege in discovery
was a stay).
34 560 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978).
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refused to impose a stay, noting: "In civil cases, the state may not
force incriminating testimony from a citizen by threatening penal-
ties or automatic unfavorable judgments. But this principle does
not control when the only consequence of silence is the danger that
the trier of fact will treat silence as evidence of guilt." 35 Courts in
civil cases are also willing to impose costs on parties due to invoca-
tions. In criminal cases, it is well settled that one cannot make the
invocation of the privilege "costly" to the defendant,3 6 meaning
that no adverse consequences may flow from the assertion. Re-
cently, the concept that the assertion could not be made too costly
in civil cases has been upheld by the Supreme Court in Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham.3 7 In Lefkowitz, the Court struck down a New York stat-
ute which required a public official to waive his privilege during a
grand jury investigation or be fired and barred from public office
for five years. The Court felt that imposing such consequences
upon the person invoking the fifth amendment was unconstitu-
tional because the imposed penalty made the assertion too costly.
On the civil side, however, it is not clear that this is the rule; courts
have been willing to impose "costs" on parties who assert their fifth
amendment privilege.38
The courts have struggled with these methods of controlling
the privilege against self-incrimination. The problem with judicial
responses to abuses of the privilege is that the solutions may be
worse than the abuses themselves. The difficulty lies in the poten-
tial prejudicial impact which may occur if the fact-finder learns of
the invocation. Courts want to avoid the "layman's natural first
suggestion. . . that resorting to privilege in each instance is a clear
confession of crime." 39 The jury is likely to draw this inference re-
gardless of whether the case involved is a criminal or civil case.
Recognizing the problems inherent in allowing the invocation
of the fifth amendment in civil cases, the Supreme Court decided
Baxter v. Palmigiano.40 In Baxter, a prisoner remained silent at a dis-
ciplinary hearing and this silence was used against him at the hear-
ing. The First Circuit had held that this was impermissible because
35 Id. at 478 (citations omitted). Thus, the court, relying on Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425
U.S. 308 (1976), refused to issue a protective order under FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b). But cf
United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (in ivhich the Supreme Court appeared to
validate the notion of protective orders as a means of preventing civil cases from becoming
a tool for criminal discovery).
36 See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (privilege is not to be cut down by
making its assertion costly).
37 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
38 See notes 49-55 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of Supreme Court tol-
erance for the imposition of costs in civil cases.
39 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, § 2272, at 426.
40 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
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the fifth amendment through the fourteenth amendment prohibited
the state from making assertion of the privilege this costly.4 1 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that here silence alone did not
cause an automatic guilty decision. Rather, the decision was based
on other substantial evidence in the record. 42 The Baxter Court
went on to conclude: "The Fifth Amendment does not preclude
the inference where the privilege is claimed by a party to a civil
cause. -
4 3
In Baxter, the Supreme Court had to distinguish a prior line of
cases which it did not wish to overrule.44 In these cases, the Court
had held that statutes which required parties to civil proceedings to
waive their fifth amendment privilege or face automatic imposition
of severe economic sanctions were unconstitutional.45 Justice
Brennan in Baxter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, found
the majority opinion inconsistent with the Court's previous Garrity
line of cases.46 Brennan considered the crucial factors to be the
imposition of a severe sanction, thirty days in solitary confinement
in Baxter, and the fact that the government was a party to the ac-
tion.47 If it were simply a case of drawing adverse inferences
against invoking parties, Brennan stated:
I would have difficulty holding such an inference impermissible
in civil cases involving only private parties. But I would hold
that compulsion violating the privilege is present in any pro-
ceeding, criminal or civil, where a government official puts ques-
tions to an individual with the knowledge that the answers might
tend to incriminate him.48
The Supreme Court followed the Baxter decision in Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham,49 where the Court held that a New York statute vio-
lated the parties' fifth amendment privilege. 50 The majority relied
41 Id. at 316.
42 Id. at 317.
43 Id. at 318 (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2272, at 439 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).
44 See notes 51-54 infra and accompanying text.
45 The Supreme Court tried to distinguish Baxter from these other cases on the grounds
that in the other cases, the invocation alone caused an automatic imposition of severe eco-
nomic sanctions. 425 U.S. at 317.
46 Justice Brennan had difficulty reconciling Baxter with the Lefkowitz line of cases stat-
ing: "Since the Court does not overrule the Garrity-Lekowitz group of decisions, those
precedents compel the conclusion that this constituted impermissible compulsion." 425
U.S. at 333 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Judge Stern's dissent in Lionti v. Lloyd's Ins.
Co., 709 F.2d 237, 246 n.5 (1983) whereJudge Stern stated: "I read Baxter and Lefkowitz v.
Cunningham . .. to say that such inferences, while clearly costly, are acceptable until they
become too costly."
47 425 U.S. at 331, 333.
48 Id. at 334.
49 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
50 In Cunningham, a New York statute provided that if an officer of a political party
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on Lefkowitz v. Turley,5 1 Garrity v. New Jersey,52 Gardner v. Broderick,53
and Uniform Sanitation Men v. Commissioner of Sanitation54 to reach this
result and dealt with Baxter only by reference in a footnote 55
Together Baxter and Cunningham seem to hold that inferences
can be drawn against invoking parties in civil litigation when other
evidence supporting the result exists. The proper weight to accord
these inferences has been left to the lower courts to decide. 56
III. Lower Courts' Expansion of Adverse Inferences as a
Weapon Against Invocations
Even before Baxter, the lower courts struggled with a number
of issues concerning adverse inferences as a method of controlling
fifth amendment invocations in civil cases. For example, lower
courts have had to consider how strong an inference should be
granted. The courts have not reached a consensus. In National Ac-
ceptance Co. of America v. Buthelter,57 the court maintained that a de-
fendant's claim of the fifth amendment was not an admission of the
refused to testify in front of a grand jury he lost his office and was barred from holding any
other party or public office for five years. The appellee, an attorney, lost his office when he
refused to waive his immunity. The Supreme Court held this statute violated his right to be
free from compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 802 n. 1.
51 414 U.S. 70 (1973) (The Supreme Court struck down a New York statute which re-
quired state contractors to waive immunity and privilege or lose existing contracts and be
barred for five years from contracting with the state.).
52 385 U.S. 493 (1967) (The Court held unconstitutional a forfeiture-of-office statute
where police officers who refused to waive immunity and answer questions during an inves-
tigation were automatically removed from office.).
53 392 U.S. 273 (1968) (police officer could not be dismissed solely because he refused
to waive his fifth amendment privilege).
54 392 U.S. 280 (1968) (State of New York could not force employees to choose be-
tween their constitutional rights and their jobs).
55 431 U.S. at 808 n.5. Footnote 5 of the majority's opinion states:
Baxter v. Palmigiano is not to the contrary. That case involved an administrative
disciplinary proceeding in which the respondent was advised that he was not re-
quired to testify, but that if he chose to remain silent his silence could be consid-
ered against him. Baxter did no more than permit an inference to be drawn in a
civil case from a party's refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was only
one of a number of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a
penalty, and was given no more probative value than the facts of the case war-
ranted; here, refusal to waive the Fifth Amendment privilege leads automatically
and without more to an imposition of sanctions.
Id. (citations omitted). .
56 For an example of some of the procedural issues involved, see National Acceptance Co.
of Am. v. Buthelter, 705 F.2d 924 (7th Cir. 1983) (claim of privilege in answer to complaint
not an admission). See also De Antonio v. Soloman, 42 F.R.D. 320, 322 (D. Mass. 1967) (no
summary judgment for defendant's failure to produce incriminating document at discov-
ery). FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d) treats defendant's claim of the privilege as equivalent to a specific
denial. Hughes Tool Co. v. Meier, 489 F. Supp. 354, 375 (D. Utah 1977); 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1280, at 360-61 (1969). See notes 57-
62 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of the weight to be given these inferences.
57 705 F.2d 924, 932 (7th Cir. 1983).
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plaintiffs allegations and, accordingly, would not support a motion
for summary judgment.58 The court decided that treating the invo-
cation as an admission is not permissible because Baxter indicates
this is a constitutionally impermissible cost. 59
Nevertheless, the court in Young Sik Woo v. Glantz 60 indicated
that, in at least certain instances, the inference drawn by the invoca-
tion will support a summary judgment or a directed verdict. 61 In
Young Sik Woo, the defendant claimed that invocation of his privi-
lege against self-incrimination "insulates him against plaintiffs
Rule 56 thrust."62 The court held that since an inference can be
drawn at trial under Baxter, nothing prevents the inference from be-
ing drawn at the "paper trial contemplated by Rule 56."63 The
court then noted the criteria needed before a Baxter inference could
be drawn: (1) the case must involve a civil action; (2) the party seek-
ing the inference must have a prima facie case without it; and (3)
the person invoking must be a party and not a mere witness.64 But
later cases reveal that these criteria may not be as widely recognized
as the court in Young Sik Woo believed.
As courts have expanded the permissible circumstances under
which inferences may be drawn, they have attacked the Young Sik
Woo requirement that the invoking witness must be a party before
an inference may be drawn. The rule was first extended to allow
inferences where the invoker is an employee or agent of the party
against whom an inference is sought. 65 Courts and commentators
rationalize this by treating the invocation as a vicarious statement of
the employer.66 While Heidt, a proponent of this extension, recog-
58 Id. at 931.
59 Id. at 932.
60 99 F.R.D. 651 (D.R.I. 1983).
61 The court noted the costs under the Garrity-Lekowitz line of cases all involved FED. R.
Civ. P. 37 sanctions for failure to make discovery. The court held a FED. R. Civ. P. 56
motion for summary judgment is a disposition on the merits and adverse inferences may be
considered as a factor. 99 F.R.D. at 652-53.
62 Id. at 651.
63 The court also cites with approval 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2018, at 148 (1970), which provides: "In some cases if a party claims the
privilege and does not give his own evidence, there will be nothing to support his view of
the case and a finding against him or even a directed verdict or grant of summary judgment
will be proper." Id. at 653.
64 99 F.R.D. at 653 n.3. The court relies on Moxham, A Comment Upon The Effect Of
Exerdse of One's Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Litigation, 12 N. ENG. L. REV. 265, 267 (1967).
65 See Heidt, supra note I, at 1119-26. See also E. H. Boerth Co. v. LAD Properties, 82
F.R.D. 635 (D. Minn. 1979); notes 66-69 infra and accompanying text.
66 This rationale is explained by Heidt who suggests four justifications for treating em-
ployee invocations as vicarious statements of employers: (1) Employees are not likely to
risk their job by giving false statements, but they have every motive to exculpate an em-
ployer if they can; (2) Reliability of vicarious statements is supported by the probability that
the speaker will be informed when the subject concerns matters within the scope of employ-
ment. Invocations share this when the triggering question concerns an employee's work;
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nizes that allowing the inference may seem inequitable, he believes
there are measures a party can take to mitigate the harshness. 67
Heidt indicates that inferences are needed to prevent employers
from pressuring employees into invoking "early and often." 68
Courts seem to accept the view that inferences may be drawn
against employers for employee/agent invocations even if they are
not adequately explaining the rationale for this position.69
The leading case allowing inferences against an employer
based upon an employee's invocation of the fifth amendment is
Ralph Hegman Co. v. Transamerica Insurance Co. ,70 where the court al-
lowed an inference to be drawn against a surety where the bonded
person invoked the fifth amendment. The court stated that if the
jury could have drawn inferences against the employee because of
his assertion of the privilege, there was no sound reason "why the
jury should not be permitted to draw the same inferences in consid-
ering the substantially identical claim of the plaintiff against appel-
lant." 7' This court felt a different result might be required if there
was no relationship between the witness and the party.72
When courts allow inferences to be drawn against present em-
ployers or sureties, the policy concerns underlying the privilege are
not undermined. 73 But when the relationship is severed between
the witness and the party before the witness's invocation, allowing
the inference is improper. The courts, by extending Baxter to this
context, do not aid the fact-finding process, but instead injure the
adversarial process.
Lionti v. Lloyd's Insurance Co. 74 illustrates the confusion in this
(3) The employer has access to information that refutes or explains the inference; and
(4) The assertion is inherently more reliable because it is made under oath. Heidt, supra
note I, at 1120-21. See also 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 426, at 318-
22 (1980). But see notes 100-06 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of why this
rationale should not be extended to the invocations of ex-employees or agents.
67 Heidt, supra note 1, at 1121-22. Heidt points to the following: (1) The employee's
duty to reveal this information to the corporate agent appointed to reply to interrogatories
on the matter; (2) The party should be able to influence the employee's decision to invoke;
and (3) Corporate defendants are often held responsible for the behavior of employees
during the course of litigation.
68 Id. at 1123.
69 See Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc., 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1984); Brink's
Inc. v. City of New York, 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983); Popular Grove Planting & Refining
Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. La. 1979); E. H. Boerth v. LAD
Properties, 82 F.R.D. 635 (D. Minn. 1979); Ralph Hegman Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
293 Minn. 323, 198 N.W.2d 555 (1972).
70 293 Minn. 323, 198 N.W.2d 555 (1972).
71 Id. at 326, 198 N.W.2d at 557.
72 Id. at 326, 198 N.W.2d at 558. The court stated: "The question of whether the same
rule should apply to a non-party witness who is totally unrelated to either party in an action
is not necessarily controlled by the above analysis."
73 See notes 67-68 supra and accompanying text.
74 709 F.2d 237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 490 (1983).
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area. In Lionti, the plaintiff sued to collect insurance proceeds after
the plaintiff's restaurant burned down and the defendant refused to
pay the fire insurance claim. A former employee of the plaintiff in-
voked his fifth amendment privilege on the stand when asked about
the origins of the fire, thus creating the impression that the ex-em-
ployee, not the plaintiff, had started the fire. The defendant then
introduced the testimony of one of its agents, who repeated that the
ex-employee had told him that the ex-employee had nothing to do
with the fire but that the employer had asked the employee's advice
on how one would start a fire that would destroy the restaurant. At
trial, this hearsay was held admissible as a prior inconsistent state-
ment with the ex-employee's invocation. Therefore, it could only
be used to impeach. 75
On appeal, the Third Circuit considered only the propriety of
the insurance agent's testimony, not the evidentiary value of the ex-
employee's invocation, and found that the admission of the testi-
mony was harmless error given the great weight of evidence sup-
porting a verdict for the defendant. 76 Judge Stern dissented:
"Whether there is evidential value in a non-party witness's invoca-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege in a civil case is an issue no
court of appeals has ever squarely addressed." 77 Arguing that the
majority opinion impliedly assumed there is evidentiary value in
these invocations, Judge Stern stated:
Provided that such behavior [non-party witness invocation] is
not the responsibility of either party, it does not work any un-
fairness which requires penalization. To the contrary, it is by
allowing inferences from a witness's refusal to testify that one
party will be harmed, and in a manner that is beyond his power
to control. While a party may be able to deflect the damage of
adverse inferences taken from his own invocation through, for
example, rehabilitating examination by his counsel, he is unable
to defend against an adverse inference drawn against a witness
which in turn harms his own case.78
Two recent court of appeals cases also allowed inferences to be
drawn against parties based upon others' invocations of their privi-
lege against self-incrimination. Both Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P
Steel, Inc. ,79 and Brink's Inc. v. City of New York, 80 allowed the adverse
inference even though the relationship between the party and the
invoking witness had ended.81
75 Id. at 241.
76 Id. at 244.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 246.
79 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 53 U.S.L.W. 3417 (1984) (No. 84-338).
80 717 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1983).
81 In Rosebud Sioux Tribe, the invoking witness, Richard Lone Dog, had been receiving
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Brink's originally involved an action by Brink's against the City
of New York to recover money under a contract for the collection of
parking meter receipts. The City cross-claimed against Brink's, al-
leging that Brink's had negligently allowed thefts of the receipts.
Brink's asserted a third-party claim against its ex-employees based
upon the City's claim against Brink's. At trial, the City won a large
award. Brink's appealed based partially upon the drawing of infer-
ences from ex-employees' invocations of their fifth amendment
privilege.8 2 Brink's contended the trial court had erred in allowing
the City to call the witnesses knowing 'they would invoke the privi-
lege in response to specific questions, and in allowing the City's
counsel to rely upon these invocations in summation.83
The Second Circuit began its analysis with Federal Rule of Evi-
dence 501.184 While the court noted that Supreme Court Standard
513-1 indicated an intent to strengthen the privilege, the court felt
the rule did not distinguish between criminal and civil cases.8 5 The
court stated that, in this case, Brink's benefited from the inference
in its third-party claim against its ex-employees. But as an original
party defendant, it preferred not to have the inference drawn. For
unclear reasons, the court stated that this shows the inappropriate-
ness of a bright-line rule in civil actions.8 6 This reasoning is obvi-
ous make-weight since the ex-employees would be judgment-proof
to Brink's for the amount of money involved. Citing Baxter as pre-
cedent that there is no constitutional mandate against allowing in-
ferences in this case, the court accepted Professor Heidt's
argument: "The fact that the invokers of the privilege are no
longer employees of the defendant does not necessarily bar admit-
tance of their refusals to testify as vicarious admissions of their for-
mer employer, Professor Heidt argues, ... and we see no reason
for a different result."8 7
payoffs from an agent of the defendant corporation, A & P Steel. Lone Dog's relationship
with the defendant had ended by the trial date. Brink's involved an ex-employee's invoca-
tion at trial when questioned about alleged thefts of parking meter receipts. In neither case
was there evidence that the invoking witness owed some special duty to the party at the time
of the invocation. See also Popular Grove Planting and Refining Co. v. Bache Halsey Stuart
Inc., 465 F. Supp. 585 (M.D. La. 1979) (Prior to trial, employee had been fired for acts
upon which he based his invocation and an inference was drawn against the former
employer.).
82 717 F.2d at 707.
83 Id.
84 FED. R. EvID. 501 provides: "the privilege of a witness. . . shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts in light of reason
and experience."
85 See note 21 supra.
86 717 F.2d at 708.
87 Id. at 710 (citing Heidt, supra note 1, at 1119-20 n.214) (citations omitted). In fair-
ness to Heidt, the court omitted key language from this footnote. Heidt would require
some factor which suggests that the former employee retains some loyalty to the former
19851 NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The majority then considered the question of whether the prej-
udicial impact of the ex-employees' invocations outweighed their
probative value. The court summarily held that the probative value
outweighed the prejudicial impact.8 8
In a compelling dissent, Judge Winter noted the severe
problems with the majority's approach: "This holding allows juries
to draw prejudicial inferences from leading questions put to wit-
nesses, denies parties the right to cross-examine, and is an invita-
tion to sharp practice."8 9 Judge Winter argued that in this case the
prejudicial impact outweighed any probative value. The only evi-
dentiary value was derived from the fact-specific questions posed by
the City's attorney because, given the Hoffman standard of when the
privilege may be invoked, it cannot be inferred what the party's an-
swer might be. Posing questions which suggest the answer "yes"
when no answer is given "inevitably invites jurors to give eviden-
tiary weight to questions rather than answers." 90 In addition, the
party against whom the inference will be drawn is denied the right
to effective cross-examination. 9' Unlike the majority, Judge Winter
felt that Baxter applied only when a witness who is a party to the
action invokes the privilege, not when a non-party witness invokes. 92
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. A & P Steel, Inc. 93 also addressed the issue
of drawing adverse inferences against a party based on the invoca-
tion of a witness no longer in any special relationship with the
party. 94 In Rosebud, the Eighth Circuit granted the Tribe's rule
60(b) motion for a new trial based, in part, on the trial court's fail-
ure to allow the Tribe to call a witness who intended to invoke the
fifth amendment. The Tribe had hoped to draw adverse inferences
against the defendant based upon the witness's invocation. 95 The
employer. Nevertheless, the court chose to ignore this point. Heidt cites Ralph Hegman
Co. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 293 Minn. 323, 198 N.W.2d 535 (1972), as supporting his
proposition. In this author's view, this is an overly expansive reading of the holding.
88 717 F.2d at 710. FED. R. EvID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste
of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."
89 717 F.2d at 715 (Winter, J., dissenting).
90 Id. at 716 (An example of this problem is the actual testimony in this case to which
Judge Winter points.).
91 See id. at 716 (Judge Winter's hypothetical example of a series of questions that is the
best that a prospective cross-examiner could hope to accomplish to defeat the adverse
inference).
92 Id. at 718.
93 733 F.2d 509 (8th Cir. 1984).
94 Id. at 512 (The invoking witness, Richard Lone Dog, had never been directly em-
ployed by the defendant corporation, A & P Steel, but he was receiving payoffs from
Michael Strain and the ultimate source of these funds was A & P Steel.).
95 The facts of this case are quite complicated, so a synopsis of the events and chief
characters follows: Strain, an attorney employed by the Tribe, was instrumental in ob-
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court of appeals reversed, holding that denying the Tribe this op-
portunity was error because: "The policies supporting the Fifth
Amendment apply with even less force when a non-party witness
testifies in a civil proceeding and thus, the Amendment should not
work to preclude an adverse inference in this situation." 96 In effect,
the court held that there is evidentiary value in a non-party's asser-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege. The Eighth Circuit stated
that the trial had given A & P Steel an unfair advantage: "By intro-
ducing into evidence Lone Dog's favorable deposition testimony, A
& P made Lone Dog its principal witness and, simultaneously, effec-
tively precluded the opportunity for cross-examination." 97 The
simpler solution would be to allow neither the deposition nor the
invocation into evidence. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides
ample grounds for denying admission of either the deposition or
taining a government grant to fund a new irrigation project for the Tribe. Driving Hawk,
Chairman of the Tribe, entered into contract negotiations with Don McPherson, Vice-Presi-
dent of A & P Steel, for construction of the project and a contract was signed onJune 21,
1977. Strain then formed Frontrunner Associates, a corporation which received money
from A & P Steel and made payments to Driving Hawk and Richard Lone Dog, Chairman of
Tribal Land Enterprises (T.L.E.). T.L.E. is a subsidiary of the Tribe which manages all
tribal lands. Pearce, President of A & P Steel, knowing Strain was the Tribe's attorney,
went ahead and hired Strain as a consultant to A & P Steel on the irrigation project. On
June 29, 1978, allegations of fraud, corruption, and nepotism were made concerning the
project. The Tribal Council passed a resolution suspending sign-offs and payments until
an investigation was completed. Driving Hawk kept issuing checks until they bounced. The
Tribe sued A & P Steel in the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota
for fraud, conspiracy, breach of contract, and breach of warranties arising out of the con-
tract. The jury returned a verdict for A & P Steel on its cross-claim in the amount of
$74,000. 733 F.2d at 511-13.
Before trial, the Tribe had taken a deposition of Lone Dog which contradicted the
Tribe's complaint. At trial, Lone Dog had been advised to claim the fifth amendment and
the trial court, in an in camera hearing, sustained A & P's objection to the Tribe's attempt to
call Lone Dog to the stand solely for the purpose of having him invoke the privilege in front
of the jury. A & P was then allowed to read Lone Dog's deposition into evidence over the
Tribe's objection. Unknown to the Tribe, Lone Dog had, in a separate investigation, given
grand jury testimony which showed he had lied at the previous deposition. Lone Dog also
testified about payoffs he had received from Strain. He testified that Strain had advised him
to give false testimony at the deposition. The Tribe did not become aware of this grand
jury testimony until November 1982, two months afterjudgment was entered against them
in the case. Id. at 514-15.
The Eighth Circuit held that this was new evidence, of such a nature that a new trial
would probably produce a new verdict, and ordered a new trial. Id. at 517. The court went
on to discuss the trial court's ruling that Lone Dog was unavailable as a witness and could
not be called to the stand by the Tribe. An unavailable witness is defined under FED. R.
EVID. 804(a)(1): "(a) Definition of unavailability-'Unavailable as a witness' includes situa-
tions in which the declarant-(l) is exempted by a ruling of the court on the ground of
privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement." The Eighth Cir-
cuit concluded that the Tribe should have been allowed to call Lone Dog to the stand
despite his known intention to invoke. The court concluded that, because this was a private
action, Baxter permits the drawing of inferences based upon the witness's invocation. Id. at
522. The court cited with approval Heidt, supra note 1.
96 733 F.2d at 521.
97 Id. at 522.
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the invocation.98
IV. The Lack of Sound Underpinnings for the Extension
The cases do not offer an adequate explanation of why eviden-
tiary weight should be attributed to non-party invocations of the
privilege. The best that can be said is that the actions underlying
the lawsuit occurred when the invokers stood in some special rela-
tionship with a party. 99 Presumably, courts are allowing inferences
based upon this past relationship, treating the invocations as "vica-
rious statements of employers."' 00
The courts, however, have failed to consider whether the justi-
fications which allow adverse inferences to be drawn against em-
ployers apply when an ex-employee invokes the privilege. Once the
employment relationship is severed, there is little justification for
allowing adverse inferences.10' Heidt's argument that employee in-
vocations have increased reliability 0 2 does not apply when the rela-
tionship has ended before the invocation. Heidt's first point is
true-employees will tend not to jeopardize their jobs with false
statements that discredit their employers.10 3 But the exact opposite
may be true if the employee was fired or departed on unfriendly
terms.
The second reason suggested is that if the question triggering
the invocation concerns the employee's duties, the invoker is well
informed, thus increasing the reliability of the assertion.'0 4 This
argument lacks merit when extended to ex-employees. The mere
fact that the person has knowledge does not make the invocation
more reliable. Only when this knowledge is combined with a duty
not to injure the party against whom the inference will be drawn
does the invocation have heightened reliability. Then, presumably,
the invoking party will weigh the risks of prosecution to himself
against the potential harm to himself caused by his invocation.
Third, Heidt argues that the employer has access to informa-
tion which it can offer to explain away the invocation. ,0 5 This argu-
ment assumes that the informed employer knows or can force the
ex-employee to explain why the invocation is made-a dangerous
98 For the text of FED. R. EvID. 403, see note 90 supra.
99 At trial, however, even the indicia of loyalty Heidt would require appear absent in
both Brink's and Rosebud Sioux Tribe. See notes 87, 89 supra.
100 Both Brink's and Rosebud Sioux Tribe relied upon Heidt, supra note 1, to justify the
extension. Heidt argues that the policy support for this extension is found in treating the
invocations as vicarious statements of the employer. See notes 66-67, 70-72 supra.
101 See notes 102-06 supra and accompanying text.
102 See note 66 supra.
103 Heidt, supra note 1, at 1120.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1121.
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assumption given the wide latitude of when a person may invoke
the privilege. In the case of an ex-employee, the employer must
explain away a negative inference without having any leverage to
force the invoker to explain his actions.
Finally, Heidt suggests the invocations have added value be-
cause they are made under oath. 06 This again appears to be make-
weight. The notion that the solemnity of the oath increases reliabil-
ity would support evidence allowing the inference in criminal as
well as civil cases. In addition, the significance of the oath is at least
subject to questions.
None of these reasons presents a compelling answer to Judge
Stern's or Judge Winter's analysis. In the end, by allowing infer-
ences, the courts give evidentiary weight to the questions asked by
counsel. It is one thing to allow these inferences when the person
invoking owes a duty to the party who stands to lose if he claims his
fifth amendment privilege. It is quite another to allow the inference
against a party who has absolutely no control over the invocation
being made. The fifth amendment protects our adversarial system.
In both Rosebud and Brink's, the party with the sympathetic case pre-
vailed, but at a significant cost to the fairness of the adversarial
process.
V. Conclusion
Baxter opened the door to controlling abuses of the fifth
amendment privilege in civil cases. In civil cases, most agree that
some controls must be placed on the fifth amendment's ability to
frustrate the discovery and fact-finding processes. These needs do
not justify the lengths to which some courts have gone. The fair-
ness of the judicial process is undermined if courts allow inferences
to be drawn against a party when a non-party witness in no special
relationship with a party at the time of trial invokes the fifth amend-
ment.
Dennis J. Bartlett
106 Id.
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